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EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECTS OF
CONFISCATIONS AND EXPROPRIATIONS
Ignaz Seidl-Hohenvelden*
Introduction

T

HE study of the problem of extraterritorial effects of confiscations and expropriations from the point of view of Comparative
Law has special practical importance. There are hardly any codified rules applicable to foreign confiscations and expropriations, either
in statutory law countries or in common law countries. Hence, decisions have to be based largely on generally accepted rules of public
and private international law. Such general acceptance can only be
proved by a comparative analysis of foreign as well as of domestic precedents.
These precedents vary, as conllicting maxims of international law
may be applied to the taking of private property by a foreign state,
which in tum may be either a confiscation, that is, taking without
compensation or an expropriation, that is, taking against a just indemnity. The respect due to foreign acts of state seems to require that
all taking of private property by a foreign state should be held effective. This, however, seems to be contrary to the domestic public
policy tending to protect private property. Therefore, a third
principle applicable to such cases is usually invoked. This decisive
factor is the principle of territoriality which grants every state an exclusive right to determine the legal fate of all assets situated inside its
borders.
·
By virtue of this principle, confiscations and expropriations of assets
inside the borders of a foreign state are held effective by most domestic
courts unless considerations of public policy prevail over all other arguments. By virtue of the same principle of territoriality domestic courts
deny foreign confiscations all effect on domestic assets. Yet, in spite
of this principle of the strict territoriality of all inroads on private property, foreign expropriations of domestic assets are sometimes tolerated.

I
CONFISCATIONS

A. Conpscation of Assets Outside the Conpscating State
The principle of territoriality suffers, however, no exceptions where
foreign confiscations are concerned. Any state would consider it in,,. Assistant Legal Adviser to the Austrian Federal Chancellory.-Ed.
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compatible with its own sovereign rights that assets inside its borders
should be taken without indemnity by order and for the profit of a
foreign state. This attitude does not only prevent the enforcement of
foreign confiscatory, penal or political legislation, but applies even to ·
quite inoffensive foreign tax laws.1
In addition to this argument drawn from the notion of territorial
sovereignty, courts sometimes stress other considerations supporting
this solution. The enforcement of foreign confiscations is declared to
be contrary to the domestic public policy of protecting private property
as one of the basic human rights. 2 Sometimes foreign confiscations in
connection with racial persecutions or with the seizure of enemy property are moreover considered contrary to domestic public policy by virtue
of the principles of nondiscrimination3 or of neutrality. 4
It results from the paramount importance of the principle of territoriality that countries confiscating domestic assets for their own benefit are not thereby prevented from considering similar foreign acts concerning domestic assets as being contrary to their public policy.5 Within its own territory a state may well assume rights which it would be
unwilling to grant to others.
In view of this general refusal to tolerate foreign confiscations of
domestic assets, it would seem logical that states should refrain from
claiming extraterritorial effect for their own confiscatory legislation. But
few states have shown such self-:i;estraint. 6 In most cases where courts
have tried to interpret ambiguous foreign confiscatory decrees as limiting themselves to assets situated in the confiscating state,7 they finally
1 In re Visser: H. M. Queen of Holland (Married Woman) v. Drukker, [1928]
1 Ch. 877, ANNuAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES (hereinafter cited as
ANN. Dm.) 1927-1928, No. 18. Genoa Court of Appeals, Jan. 14, 1932, ZmTsCHRIFT
FUER AUSLAENDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHI' (hereinafter cited as RABELS Z),
1935, p. 219, No. 31. Estate of Garabad Tahtabourounian, N.Y.L.J. of July 3, 1950, p. 3.
2 ENTsCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHI'S (hereinafter cited as
BGE) 68, II, 377 of Dec. 22, 1942.
3 Ibid.
4BGE 40, I, 483 at 486 of December 17, 1914; BGE 42, II, 179, especially 183-184
of April 17, 1916; BGE 44, II, 163 at _170 of April 19, 1918. Obergericht Ziirich, Nov.
11, 1942; Obergericht Ziirich, Sept. 25, 1942. Swedish Supreme Court, Sept. 25, 1944,
Hopf Products Ltd. v. Paul Hopf and Skandinaviska Banken Aktiebolag, ANN. Dre.
1943-1945, No. 16; Swedish Supreme Court, Adelfu. Paul Hopf v. Skandinaviska Banken
Aktiebolag, Oct. 16, 1944, 15 RABELS Z. 1949-1950, p. 497, No. 13.
5 Cf. French attitude in the Chartreux Cases with French decisions concerning
Russian, etc. confiscations.
6 Ingenohl v. Olsen & Co., Inc., 273 U.S. 541, 47 S.Ct. 451 (1927), ANN. Dre.
1919-1942, No. 55 Austrian Supreme Court, March IO, 1948, JurosnscHE BLAE'ITER
(hereinafter cited as ]BL) 1949, p. 70 (Teachers League Case). LG Leipzig, June 3,
1947, ZENTRALJUSTIZBLATT FUR DIE BRITISCHE ZoNE, hereinafter cited as ZJBL) 1948,
No. 1026, subsequently reversed by OLG Dresden, July 1, 1948, ZJBL, 1949 No. 234.
7Buerger v. New York Life Insurance Co., [1927] 43 T.L.R. 601 C.A.; AJS Tallina
Laevauhisus v. Estonian State S. S. Line, 80 LL.L.R. 99 at 11 I.
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have had to invoke other arguments for refusing to enforce these decrees
in respect to domestic assets, the confiscating state having subsequently
made it quite clear8 that it intended to have its decrees applied not only
to assets inside but also to assets outside its borders.
The principle of nonenforcement of foreign confi~cations is sometimes blurred by the concept of state immunity. According to AngloSaxon theory it is sufficient for a foreign state to gain possession of clomestic assets to prevent it from being sued for recovery. Although possession of domestic assets gained by a foreign state pretending to enforce its confiscatory decrees js not considered as a good title of property
thereto, 9 and although this possession may have been obtained by dubious means, the owner cannot recover his propert:y1° unless the confiscating state abandons possession, e.g., by sale to a third party.11
The respect of the territorial sovereignty of the state, where such
property is situated, should prevent a foreign state from enforcing by illegal means a confiscatory decree, which would have been unenforceable in a legal manner. Such illegal acts should not be covered by sovereign immunity. Hence, in spite of their pleas of sovereign immunity
Czechoslovak National Enterprises were rightly sentenced by Austrian
courts to hand over goods deposited in their name,1 2 and to refrain from
using trade marks13 situated in Austria which they pretended to have
acquired by virtue of the alleged extraterritorial effect of Czechoslovak
confiscations.
The only legal basis on which a foreign confiscation of domestic
assets can be made enforceable is the conclusion of a treaty to this effect
between the confiscating state and the state where the assets are situated.
On November 26, 1933, the Soviet Union concluded with the United
States the so-called Litvinov Agreement whereby it ceded its confiscatory claims to the United States, which should use them for compensating Russia's prewar creditors. Based on this agreement, the United
States succeeded in enforcing1 4 these confiscatory claims ceded by Soviet
8 E.g., Declaration of People's Commissariat for Justice of November 28, 1937, quoted
in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 at 219-220, 62 S.Ct. 552 (1942).
9 Government of the Republic of Spain v. National Bank of Scotland, [1939] S.C.
413, ANN. Dxc. 1938-1940, Nos. 77 and 90.
10 The Jupiter (No. 1) [1924] P. (C.A.) 236; Civil Air Transport Inc. v. Chennault
and Others, (1950) Supreme Court of Hong-Kong, 3 hrr. L. Q., 1950, pp. 418-420.
11 The Jupiter (No. 3) [1927] P. 122.
12 Vienna Tribunal of Commerce, June 21, 1948, Dm WmTscHAFT, WocHENAusGAllB, August 21, 1948.
13 Austrian Supreme Court, May 10, 1950, reported in OBsTBRRBicmscHB JurusTBNZBITUNG, (hereinafter cited as OJZ) Ev. BI. No. 356, 1950.
14 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 57 S.Ct. 758 (1937); United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 62 S.Ct. 552 (1942). These decisions have been severely criticized
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Russia even where this meant dispossessing United States owners.111
These decisions do not imply, however, that the United States has
abandoned the general principle of nonenforcem~nt of foreign confiscatory decrees. This principle has become inoperative only where an
executive agreement binding on the courts like any domestic law had
forced them to abandon their constant policy. This policy has been
reaffirmed in· all subsequent non-Russian confiscation cases. There,
the courts, mi.fettered by similar agreements,1 6 were free to refuse enforcement of the foreign confiscation.
.
The Litvinov Agreement had been concluded simultaneously with
the recognition of the U.S.S.R. by the United States. Confusing these
issues, some authors maintained that the enforcement of the Soviet confiscations was the consequence of the diplomatic recognition of the
U.S.S.R. and that from now on either any government already recognized could claim extraterritorial effects for its confiscatory decrees'- 7 or
at least a newly recognized government for its confiscatory decrees issued prior to recognition.18 This is not the case. Neither the confiscatory decrees of the French Government nor confiscations decreed
previous to the recognition of a newly recognized Haitian Government
have been granted extraterritorial effect in the United States.19
Courts indeed often have refused extraterritorial effect to confiscatory measures of nonrecognized governments by stating that they could
not enforce any measures decreed by nonrecognized authorities. 20 The
subsequent recognition of such governments does not, however, force
the courts to abandon the principle of-nonenforcement of foreign confiscatory decrees as some writers thought.21 It merely implies that the
courts from now on have to invoke the arguments of territoriality and
public policy instead of the argument of nonrecognition. 22
by Borchard, ''Extraterritorial Confiscation," 36 AM. J. Im-. L. 275 (1942) and by Jessup,
"The Litvinov Assignment and the Pink Case," id. at 282.
15 United

AM.

States v. New York Trust Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1946) 75 F. Supp. 583, 42

J. Im-. L. 720 (1948).

16 Bollack v. Societe Generale pour Favoriser le Developpement du Commerce et de
l'lndustrie en France, 263 App. Div. 601, 33 N.J.S. (2d) 986 (1942); ANN. Dxc. 19411942, No. 36. Plesch v. Banque Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti, 77 N.Y.S. (2d) 41,
43 (1948); 42 AM. J. Im-. L. 739-741 (1948).
17 Ehrenzweig, ]BL 1949, pp. 425-427, with respect to companies.
18 Rado, "Czechoslovak Nationalization Decrees: Some International Aspects," 41 AM.
J. Im-. L. 795 at 805. (1947).
19 Cf. note 16.
20Zarine v. Ramava, [1942] I.R. 148, ANN. Dxc. 1941-1942, No. 20. A/S Merilaid
& Co. v. Chase National Bank, 71 N.Y.S. (2d) 377 (1947); 42 AM. J. Im-. L. 231 (1948).
21 Cf. notes 17 and 18.
22 Obiter in A/S Merilaid v. Chase National Bank, supra note 20, and decisions of
New York courts between United States recognition of the U.S.S.R. and the United States

1951 ]

FOREIGN EFFECTS OF EXPROPRIATIONS

855

Apart from the very special case of the Litvinov Agreement mentioned above, there has been a constant jurisprudence throughout the
past 150 years and in all countries to hold extraterritorial confiscations
ineffective. Instances range from the American War of Independence,23 the French Chartreux Cases,24 the enemy property control
measures in World Wars I and II,211 the Soviet Russian Revolution,26
and the Spanish Civil War,27 and the German anti-Jewish measures, 28
to the Communist2 9 and anti-German measures30 after World War II,
the latest development being the refusal of the Austrian courts31 to grant
extraterritorial effect to the highly controversial Law No. 5 of the Allied
Control Council for Germany. 32
The cases were brought either (a) by the confiscating state or its
successors in title, or (b) by debtors or persons holding money for them.
Where a foreign state in order to obtain the confiscation of domestic
assets tried to enroll the help of the domestic administration as in the
Navemar case33 or in Austria after 1945,34 it was informed that such
decisions were in the exclusive competence of the domestic courts.
Cases where the con_fiscating state appears as plaintiff admittedly
suing for the handing over of domestic assets by virtue of its confiscation decrees are comparatively rare. 35 More often the foreign state or its
successors in title appear as defendants, e.g., for using outside of their
federal court decisions upholding the Litivinov Agreement, e.g., Vladikovkaszky Ry. Co. v.
New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 363, 189 N.E. 456 (1934).
23 Folliot v. Ogden, (I 789) 1 HBL. 124.
24Lecouturier v. Rey, (1910] A.C. 262; Baglin v. Cusenier, 221 U.S. 580, 31 S.Ct.
669 (1911); RG May 29, 1908, ENTscHEIDUNGEN DES RmcHSGBRICHTs IN Zxvn.sACHBN
(hereinafter cited as RGZ) 69, 1. Swiss Federal Court, Feb. 13, 1906, CLUNET 1907,
p. 213. Brazilian Federal Court, May 10, 1907, CLUNET 1907, p. 1171; Dutch Court of
Cassation, March 5, 1908, REvu:e DB Dnorr INTERNATIONAL PRIVE, 1908, p. 843; Brussels
Court of Appeals, May 20, 1910, REvtm DB DRorr INTERNATIONAL PRIVE, 1911, p. 732.
25 Cf. notes 4 and 86.
26Cf. notes·lO, 14, 15, 41-45, etc.
21 Cf. notes 9, 33, 71, 76, 92, etc.
28 Cf. notes 39 and 67.
29 Cf. notes 11, 20, 77, etc.
30 Cf. BGE 74, II, 224, of Oct 28, 1948, and notes 12, 13, 34, 52, etc.
31 Cf. note 13 and Austrian Administration Court, Feb. 2, 1950, ]BL 1950, p. 192
(Brewery Case), note by Seidl-Hohenvelden in CLUNET 1950.
82 Cf. Borchard, "The Treatment of Enemy Property," 34 GBoRGBTOWN L. J. 389 at
402 (1946), and Schindler, ''Besitzen konfiskatorische Gesetze ausserterritoriale Wirkung?"
3 ScHWEIZBRISCHEs ]AHRBUCH FUER INTBRNATIONALBS RECHT, p. 67.
83 2 HACKWORTH, A DIGEST OF lNTERNATIONAL LAw 449-450 (1942), Compania
Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 58 S.Ct. 432

(1938).
84 T. Coy (Car Factory) decision by Federal Ministry of Property Protection and
Economic Planning, }BL 1948, p. 352.
·
85 Austrian Supreme Court, July 9, 1948, OJZ Ev. BL. No. 773, 1948. Official Reports
of the Austrian Supreme Court, vol. XXI SZ (1946-1948) No. 114 (Hosiery Firm Case).
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own territory a trade mark acquired by confiscation.36 In many cases
the claim of the foreign state to domestic assets has been camouflaged in
order to circumvent the principle of nonenforcement of foreign confiscatory decrees. Confiscatory claims have been disguised as bankruptcy
proceedings,37 as custodianships under enemy property legislation38 and
as public administratorships.39 All in vain-as the domestic courts consider themselves free to appreciate what constitutes a confiscation irrespective of these attempts at disguise.
Other cases do not involve an attempted direct enforcement of the
foreign confiscatory decree. In this second category a debtor refuses to
pay his creditor, whose property had been confiscated in a foreign
country, by alleging that he had either already paid his debt to the
confiscating authorities40 or that he may be forced to do so in the
future. 41 He may also pretend that his debt has been extinguished by
the foreign confiscatory legislation. 42 Various as these pleas are, none
is able to upset the rule of the nonenforcement of the foreign confiscations of domestic assets.
36 Cf.
37 Cf.

note 13.
Jagerskiold, "Immunity of State-Owned Vessels in Swedish Juridical Practice
During World War II," 42 AM. J. !NJ:. L. 601 at 605 (1948). Swedish Supreme Court,
June IO, 1942, BABELS Z., 1949, p. 497, No. 12.
38 Cf. note 4.
39 German Public Administrators:
Belgium: Trib. Comm., Brussels, June 9, 1938, Eismann v. Melzer, BELGIQUE JumcrAIRE, 1938, p. 563.
Denmark: Maritime and Commercial Court, Feb. 17, 1939, 13 BABELS Z. 1940-1941,
p. 822.
France: Trib. Comm., Seine, Jan. 18, 1940, Jellinek v. Levy, ANN. D1c. 1919-1942,
No. 12; Trib. Comm., Seine, June 23, 1939, X v. Levit et Walter, ANN. DIC. 1919-1942,
No. 13.
Great Britain: Frankfurther v. Exner Ltd., [1947) Ch. 629, 43 AM. J. !NJ:. L. 384
(1949).
Netherlands: Dist. Ct., Rotterdam, Oct. 11, 1939, Anninger C. S. v. de Monchy
Ltd., ANN. Dre. 1919-1942, No. 9, note.
Sweden: Supreme Court, June 11, 1941, Weiss v. Simon, ANN. DIC. 1919-1942,
No. 57.
Switzerland: BGE 68, II, 381.
United States: Anninger v. Hohenberg, Supreme Ct., N.Y. County, Dec. 7, 1939,
ANN. DIC. 1938-1940, No. 7. Loeb v. Bank of Manhattan Co., 18 N.Y.S. (2d) 497 (1939).
Czechoslovak Public Administrators:
Switzerland: Wichert v. Wichert, Oct. 28, 1948, BGE 74, II, 224.
40Wolff v. Oxholm, (1817) 6 M. & S. 92; OLG Hamburg, Jan. 24, 1950, RUNDscHREIBEN DES AusSCHUSSES ZONENMAESSIC CETRENNTER BETRIEBE (hereinafter cited as
RUNDsCHREIBEN), No. 119/514.
41 Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Sedgwick, Collins & Co., [1927) A.C. 95.
Wherever the argument of double liability was upheld, the debt was held to be situated
inside the confiscating country. Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, State Superintendent
of Insurance, 240 N.Y. 149, 147 N.E. 703 (1925), ANN. Dm. 1925-1926, No. 40.
42 Trib. Civil, Melun, Nov. 18, 1926, Ghan v. Orloff, CLUNET 1927, p. 667.

1951 ]

FOREIGN EFFECTS OF EXPROPRIATIONS

857

l. Special case of companies. In the case of foreign companies
confiscated in the country of their place of incorporation, the application of this principle is complicated by the fact that under all con8.ict
of law rules, companies owe their legal personality to the law of the
country of their place of incorporation. In such cases, debtors of a
company confiscated abroad or persons holding money for it may object to its creditors and shareholders that the company having lost its
legal personality,43 can neither sue nor be sued nor liquidated.
German decisions before World War 1144 have adopted this reasoning which prevents all practical use of the domestic assets of companies
confiscated abroad. It has, however, not been applied to companies confiscated in Eastern Germany except in a single case.45
Some courts have tried to interpret foreign confiscatory decrees
concerning companies as leaving their legal persop.ality unaffected. 46
Such interpretation did, however, soon become impossible in view of
subsequent statements by the confiscating authorities. 47
Other courts, especially in France, granted these foreign companies
a continued existence as domestic "societes de fait." 48 Confiscated East
German companies could transfer their place of incorporation to Westem Germany and continue to function there. The confiscation of companies by the Eastern Laender was held ultra vires as all company matters come under the exclusive legislative competence of the Reich.49 In
view of the virtually accomplished division of Germany into two states,
I cannot follow this reasoning.
Besides, the continued existence of companies confiscated abroad
seems economically undesirable. Usually they have lost most of their
capital, and do no longer meet the minimum requirements for efficient
management and control.
Practical as well as theoretical considerations therefore require that
the loss of legal personality be recognized. The confiscated foreign corn43 Hausner v. Banque Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd, Dec. 10, 1924, BGE
50, II, 507.
44Kammergericht, Oct. 25, 1927, 2 ZEITscmuFT FUER OsTRECHT, 1928, p. 1583; RG
May 20, 1930, 129 RGZ 98.
45 LG Mannheim, Feb. 11, 1948, BETRIEBSBERAT.ER, March 15, 1948, p. 92.
46 Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Mulhouse,
[1925] A.C. 112. Banque Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd v. Goukassow, [1925]
A.C. 150. LG Gettingen, Oct. 14, 1947, NmnERSACHSISCHE REcHTSPFLEGE, 1948, p. 39.
Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Sedgwick, Collins & Co., [1927] A.C. 95. OLG
GELLE, May 28, 1948, ibid. p. 149.
47 LG Krefeld, Feb. 26, 1948, ZJBL 1948, p. 279, No. 133.
48 Trib. Comm. Seine, June 29, 1932, Veuve Lelande v. Banque russe pour le Commerce etranger, CLtJNET 1934, p. 663.
49 Cf. note 47.
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pany received its universally recognized legal personality by the state
of its place of incorporation. If this state now ends the legal personality,
this also must be recognized anywhere, even if it was done by a confiscatory decree. However, by virtue of the principle of territoriality, no
further effect than this may be granted to such foreign decrees. They
remain inapplicable insofar ;;is they pretend to confiscate domestic assets of the foreign company.
In spite of the loss of legal personality, the current affairs of such a
company may be liquidated, either by appointing a public administrator50 or by assimilating it to a deceased person, in whose name a curator
may likewise sue51 and be sued.52
However, a winding-up of the foreign company under domestic
law is required to satisfy the company's creditors and to hand the residue
over to its shareholders. This has been admitted by American,58 Austrian,54 Belgian,55 French56 and Swiss57 decisions.
The use of domestic law for winding up a foreign company5 8 rather
than the law of its place of incorporation is justified by the principle of
territoriality. By virtue of this same principle the powers of the liquidator are strictly territorial. He cannot liquidate assets which the
confiscated company owns in third countries.59
In the United Kingdom, unti1 a recent decision,60 winding-up had
been limited to companies which had previously done business there. 61
50 Car Factory Case, cf. note 34; Austrian Administrative Court, VerwG. Jan. 25,
1950, OJZ 1950, p. 242 (Cartridge Factory Case).
51 Austrian Supreme Court, July 9, 1948, cf. note 35.
52 Vienna Court of Appeals, March 3, 1948, OJZ Ev. BL No. 307, 1948.
53 Oliner v. American-Oriental Banking Corp., 282 N.Y. 748, 27 N.E. (2d) 40
(1940), by virtue of §977-b of the New York Civil Practice Act.
54 Cf. note 50.
55 Brussels Appellate Court, June 25, 1947, Compagnie Belgo-Lithuanienne d'Electricite, JotmNAL DES TRIBUNAUX'., 1948, p. 104; Trib. Comm. Liege, March 25, 1938, Van
der Heyden v. Tanneries d'Azov; R:BvuE PRATIQUE DES SoCIETES, 1939, p. 220.
56 Compagnie Nord de Moscou v. Phenix espagnol, Paris (3e ch) June 13, 1928,
CLUNET 1929, p. 119; Soc. d'Assur. Phenix espagnol v. John Cockerill, Cour Cass. (Req.)
July 4, 1933, CLUNET 1934, p. 662.
57 Federal Court, Wilbuschewitsch v. Waisenamt, Zurich, July 13, 1925, BGE 51,
II, No. 44; Erben Prochorow v. Obergericht Zurich (Sulzer SA) Oct. 26, 1929, BGE 55,
I, No. 47.
58 As provided, e.g., in the Cartridge Factory Case, supra note 50.
59 Brussels Appellate Court, July 11, 1938, in re Banque Russo-Asiatique, R:BvuE
PRATIQUE DES SocmTEs, 1939, p. 189; Danish Maritime and Commercial Court, June 8,
1937, 13 RABELS Z (1940-41) p. 832; Swedish Supreme Court, Nov. 12, 1938, Stock·
holms Enskildo Bank v. Amilakvari, ANN. Dm. 1919-42, No. 56.
GOBanque des·Marchands de Moscou v. Kindersley, (1950] Ch.D. 2 All E.R. 105,
confirmed [1950] C.A. 2 All E.R. 549.
61 Russian and English Bank v. Baring Bros. Ltd., [1936] A.C. 405, in re Tovarishestvo
Manufactur Liudvig Rabenek, [1944] Ch. 404.
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British courts formerly also doubted whether shareholders could initiate
or participate in British winding-up proceedings. 62 The courts finally
rejected63 the proposition that the rights of shareholders which they
held to be situated in the country of the place of incorporation of the
company had become extinct by virtue of the principle that confiscations
of assets situated inside the confiscating country should be held valid
everywhere. The problem of the recognition of such confiscations and
of the attribution of a situs to intangibles rendered necessary by this
recognition will be dealt with in the next section.64
B. Confiscation of Assets Inside the Confiscating Country
A confiscation by a foreign state may not only be brought to the
notice of domestic courts in connection with its pretended effects on
domestic assets. There is also the case of former owners claiming assets,
which the foreign state had confiscated inside its own borders, but
which later were brought within the jurisdiction of domestic courts.
If we follow the same principle of territoriality, whereby every
state has an exclusive right to determine by itself the legality of any
title to assets situated inside its borders, this principle which served so
well to prevent the foreign state from extending its confiscations to domestic assets now seems to require that titles to property gained by confiscation of assets situated inside the borders of the confiscating state
should be recognized as good titles everywhere. 65
The principle that due respect shall be given to foreign acts of
state is another argument in favor of this solution. This respect of
foreign acts of state continues to be extended by some courts even to
the subsequently repudiated confiscations of Vichy France66 as well as
to the German anti-Jewish measures, 67 and that even after they were
found criminal by the Nuremberg judgment.
62 Russian

and English Bank v. Baring Bros. and Co., Ltd., [1932] 1 Ch. 435-445.
Dairen Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha v. Shiang Kee, (1941] A.C. 373.
64 Cf. infra pp. 863-864.
65 Austrian Supreme Court, Aug. 27, 1919, in re Austro-Hungarian Bank, G:llRicm'SZl!ITUNG 1919, p. 380; Antwerp, Civil Tribunal, Feb. 21, 1939, "Propetrol" "Petroservice" and "Petrolest" v. Compagnia Mexicano de Petreoleo and Tankage and Transport,
ANN. Dm. 1938-40, No. 11; A. M. Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 3 K.B. 532.
66 Perrin-Jares es qualites v. Masi, Monaco Trib. Civ., March 11, ~948, 43 AM. J.
lNT. L. 820 (1949).
67 Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., (2d Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 246, 42 AM.
J. INT. L. 217 (1948); Bernstein v. Nederlandsche Amerikaanische Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 42 AM. J. lNT. L. 726 (1948), and 43 AM. J. lNT. L. 180 (1949); Novello &
Co., Ltd. v. Ernst Eulenburg, Ltd., [1950] C.A. 1 All E.R. 44, 49; Austrian Supreme
Restitution Commission, Oct. 30, 1948, OJZ Ev. BL. No. 47, 1949, ]BL 1949, p. 18.
63
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Considerations of political and economic expediency also strongly
support the widely accepted solution, which prevents former owners of
assets confiscated in a foreign state from claiming their restitution as
soon as the assets are brought within the jurisdiction of domestic courts.
Such restitutions would soon bring trade with some confiscating countries to a virtual standstill. Hence, in 1929, a British lawyer asked for
more stringent and sweeping Soviet confiscation laws to prevent all
such restitution claims, as this would greatly contribute to the promotion of Anglo-Soviet trade. 68
It must, however, be admitted that although this solution is in conformity with the principle of territoriality, it remains notwithstanding
shocking to our notions of morals and equity that, e.g., a Russian refugee should see her own family portraits sold at Berlin60 and London70
auctions by successors in title to the confiscating state, without being
able to reclaim her property.
Some countries, therefore, prefer to abandon the principle of territoriality. They consider the protection of private property as such a
basic aim of their public policy that they do not only reject foreign confiscatory claims on domestic assets but refuse to recognize even titles
acquired by confiscation of assets situated inside the confiscating state
as being contrary to their public policy. A French court justified this
paramount importance attributed to the principle of protection of private property by the fact that it is one of the basic human rights. 71
Some support is lent to this view by the fact that the London Declaration of January 5, 1943, concerning property looted in Axis-occupied
territories72 likewise disregarded the principles of territoriality and of
the respect due to foreign acts of state. It must, however, not be forgotten that this was a wartime measure and that domestic policy, in this
case, far from working in favor of the maintenance of normal trade relations, welcomed this opportunity of inflicting additional economic sanctions against the enemy in this indirect manner. Under normal circumstances, however, countries generally prefer the maintenance of trade
relations with the confiscating state to the enforcement of moral principles by means of invoking public policy. Hence the cases following
such ethical considerations do not at present constitute the prevailing
68 3 ZE!TSCHRlFT FUER 0sTRECHT, 1929, pp. 1160-66.
60 LG Berlin, II, Dec. 11, 1928, Schubatow v. Lepkes Kunstauktionshaus,
scHRIFT FUER 0STRECHT 1929, pp. 1366-70.
70 Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, [1929] 1 K.B. 718.
71 Trib. Comm. Marseille, May 25, 1937, Potassas lbericas v. Volatron,

1937, p. 535.
72 CMD, 6418

Mxsc.

No. 1 (1934).
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practice. It may, however, be hoped that they are the first signs of a
future trend in this direction.
Domestic courts show special reluctance to recognize titles acquired
by confiscation inside the confiscating state, if the victims are nationals
of their own country. They may in this case rely on the fact that a state
violates a rule of public international law if it confiscates property of
foreigners. None the less, the United States73 and some other countries74 uphold the title of the confiscating state even against their own
nationals. These nationals are unable to reclaim in domestic courts any
property lost abroad through confiscation.75 States adopting this attitude are all the same aware of the fact that the foreign confiscating state
violated a rule of public international law. They maintain, however,
that the only sanction for this international wrong lies in a claim for
damages through diplomatic channels. French76 and German77 courts,
however, have given their own nationals the possibility to reclaim their
movable assets confiscated within the foreign country. French courts
extended this even to goods produced in French-owned mines, after
these mines were confiscated in the foreign state concerned. 78 In spite
of the apparent soundness of invoking public policy in such cases we
must not be blind to the practical and theoretical difficulties connected
with putting it above the principles of territoriality and of respect of
foreign acts of state. Besides, nonrecognition of such confiscations
would often be tantamount to economic sanctions against the confiscating state. The principle of public policy itself thus is not exclusively in
favor of such nonrecognition, the maintenance of international trade
exchanges being as much in the national interest as the protection of
private property.
Another case where the recognition of the title of the confiscating
state to property confiscated inside its borders is particularly shocking
arises when this foreign state has lost or never acquired possession of the
asset which it now seeks to recover in domestic courts as its property.
73 Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 38 S.Ct. 312 (1918).
74 In re Russian Bank for Foreign Trade, [1933] I Ch. 745; Austrian Supreme Court,
cf. note 67, and a German decision, which however is contrary to current German practice,
LG Hildesheim, Nov. 18, 1947, 15 RABELS Z (1949-50), p. 137.
111 Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468, 57 S.Ct. 261 (1937).
76 Aix Appellate Court, March 25, 1939, Volatron v. Moulin, ANN. D.m. 1938-40, No.
10; Nunes Appellate Court, May 19, 1941, Bloch v. Potassas lbericas, LA PRADELLB REvtra
DB DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE (1942) p. 389.
77 LG Kassel, July 20, 1948, AG Waibling, June 26, 1948, AG Dingolfing, Dec. 7,
1948-all concerning Czechoslovak confiscations, reported in 15 RABELS Z (1949-50) pp.
138-40 and OLG Niirnberg, Sept. 19, 1949, RUNDSCHRBIBBN No. 122/527 concerning
East German confiscation.
78 Cf. note 76.
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To recognize its title in such a case may seem indistinguishable from
enforcement of a foreign confiscatory claim on domestic assets and may
be rejected on these grounds. 79 Besides, a restrictive interpretation of
the notion of confiscation may lead to the same result.
For even if most courts still seem to adhere to the principle of recognizing the title of the confiscating state to property confiscated within
its borders, this principle has to be very strictly interpreted in view of
the many objections raised against it. Domestic courts are free to apply
the restrictive interpretations given below, regardless of any interpretation by the confiscating country.
Due respect should only be given to acts of state of recognized
governments. Confiscatory acts by unrecognized governments within
their sphere of influence were rightly likened to acts by bandits and
held to be without any legal effect. 80 This presupposes, however. that
recognition does not continue to be withheld, ~hile normal trade relations have practically been resumed with the country concerned. In
such cases Swiss81 and American82 courts had to resort to the uneasy
argumentation that equity requires the recognition of such confiscatory
acts by a nonrecognized government, in order to protect such pre-recognition trade. For similar reasons recognition is held to be retroactive. 83
Although a state may issue confiscatory legislation whereby it purports to acquire the property of assets inside its borders even without
taking actual possession of them, such actual taking of possession is
necessary to complete a confiscation which is to be recognized abroad. 84
Due respect shall be given only to foreign acts of state made within
the territory of the foreign state concerned. Confiscation of private
property in occupied enemy territory is ultra vires and contrary to the
79 Etat Russe v. Ropit, Trib. Comm. Marseille, April 23, 1925, CumET 1925, p. 395;
Cour de Cass. (Req.), March 5, 1928, CLUNET 1928, p. 674; Trib. Civ. Mansourah (le
ch), March 25, 1924, CuJNET 1925, p. 209.
.
so A. M. Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 1 K.B. 456; Bounatian v. Societe Optorg, Trib. Civ.
Seine (5), Dec. 12, 1923, CuJNET 1924, p. 133; The Nueva Anna and Liebre, 6 Wheat.
(19 U.S.) 193 (1821); Petrogradsky M.K. Bank v. National City Bank of New York,
253 N.Y. 23, 170 N.E. 479 (1930), cert. den. 282 U.S. 878, 51 S.Ct. 82 (1930), ANN.
Toe. 1929-30, No. 20.
81 Poitiers Appellate Court, July 26, 1937, Rousse et Maher v. Banque d'Espagne;
cf. note 43.
82 Salimoff v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, Salimoff v. Vacuum Oil Co., 262 N.Y.
220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933), ANN. DIG. 1933-34, No. 8.
83 Cf. A. M. Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 1 K.B. 456, being reversed on appeal; A. M.
Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 3 K.B. 532, after the United Kingdom had recognized the
U.S.S.R.
84 Don Alonso de Velasco v. Comero (1612), sub nom. Sir John Watts, quoted by
A. N. SACK in LAW, A CENTURY OF PnocREss, Vol. 3, pp. 363-364; Frenkel & Co. v.
l'Urbaine Fire Ins. Co. of Paris, 251 N.Y. 243,_ 167 N.E. 430 (1929).
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Hague Rules of Land Warfare. 85 Although such confiscation appears
to be an act of state of the occupation authorities, it does not give them
an internationally recognized title to such property. 86
The thorniest problem raised by the necessity of restrictively interpreting the principle set out above is the definition of the situs of intangibles. As in the case of tangible assets, the question whether the
confiscation shall be held valid or not depends on whether the asset
is situated in or outside the confiscating state. But while it is easy
enough to determine the situs of tangibles, the situs of intangibles is
not so easily established. The definition of the situs given by the confiscating state should be disregarded; otherwise, by declaring all intangibles connected in any way with confiscated property to be situated within its borders, such a state could considerably increase its confiscatory
hauls.
In view of the conflict of theories and decisions concerning the situs
of intangibles, a judge will often find equally good authority for holding
intangibles to be situated inside or outside the confiscating country. In
such cases he will follow the authority which will enable him to solve
the case before him in the most equitable manner. The equity of the
solution depends, however, largely on the economic facts of the case.
If the domestic assets of a foreign confiscated person are small compared to the number of its foreign and domestic creditors or shareholders, none of them would be much better off after the liquidation if all
of them were allowed to press all their claims. Courts tend in such cases
to exclude debts concluded in the confiscating country and shareholders
living there87 by considering these debts or shares to be situated inside
the confiscating country, hence extinguished by virtue of its confiscatory legislation.
In other cases, considerable assets may remain after satisfaction of
the domestic creditors and shareholders. I do not think that these assets
should be considered to be res nullius, 88 since then the domestic courts,
85 Article 46.
86 Neutral states

refused to recognize such titles (Papadopoulos of Pera v. Kon. Ned.
Stoomboot-Maatschappij of Amsterdam and J. W. Whittal & Co. Ltd., District Ct. Amsterdam, April 17, 1925, ANN. D1c. 1925-26, No. 19, and Ct. of Appeals Amsterdam,
March 13, 1928, ANN. DIG. 1927-28, No. 17) as well as the courts of the occupied state
after liberation (Belgium, Ct. of Appeals Liege, Oct. 19, 1945, Delville v. Servais, ANN.
DIG. 1943-45, No. 157) or even during the occupation (Norway, Dist. Ct. Aker, Aug. 25,
1943, Overland's Case, ANN. Toe. 1943-45, No. 156, Austrian Supreme Court, Oct. 27,
1947, OJZ Ev. BL. No. 22, 1948).
8 7 Obergericht Zurich, Dec. 19, 1928, Pettai v. Schinz, ZEITSCHRIFT FUER OsTREcHT,
1929, p. 1403, concerning creditors and cases mentioned in note 51 concerning creditors
and shareholders.
88 As suggested in Russian and English Bank v. Baring Bros., [1936] A.C. 405.
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while rejecting the foreign state's confiscatory claims as contrary to their
public policy, would present their own state with the proceeds of this
obnoxious confiscation. Here, the judge may tend to consider debts and
shares to be situated in any place where assets of the debtor or of' the
company may be found. Such debts or shares thereby become domestic
assets. In this case, none of the claimants would be excluded by virtue
of the foreign confiscation. 89 The shares of West German shareholders
of an East German company confiscated in Eastern Germany were declared void by West German courts in order to enable those shareholders
to claim the company's West German assets. 90
Even where rules concerning the situs of intangibles are too definite
to leave the judge such choice, he may, by invoking public policy, refuse
to recognize the confiscation of intangibles which these rules would
place inside the confiscating country. Legal fictions can more easily be
set aside than facts when they thwart public policy. 91 As far as tangibles are concerned, however, I cannot fully overcome my apprehensions against invoking public policy.
Such a course may be justified by ethical considerations, but its_ theoretical basis is slender. Besides, as political and economic factors tend
to render it risky or impracticable, it has not until now found favor
with the majority of the courts.

II
EXPROPRIATIONS

A. Definition
To what extent are the rules set out above for confiscations applicable to expropriations, i.e., to cases where the state taking the property
pays a just indemnity?
B. Expropriation of Assets Inside the Expropriating State

As the foreign state usually _acquires an internationally recognized
title to assets situated inside its borders even by confiscation, i.e., when
taking them without indemnity, it may all the more claim international
recognition for the expropriation of such assets made against indemnity.
89 Cour de Paris (3e ch), Jan. 3, 1944, Banque Russe v. Technogor; NrnoYl!T's
REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE, 1947, p. 79, OLG Braunschweig, Jan.
20, 1948, 3 DEUTSCHE REcHTs-ZEITSCHRIFT (1948) 251.
oo AG Krefeld, May 25, 1949, RuNDSCHREIBEN, No. 107/451. The Swiss federal
court, however, has refused a similar request made by Jewish owners of shares which had
oeen confiscated in Germany pursuant to the German anti-Jewish legislation, 66 BGE
1940, II, 37, 15 RABELS Z (1949-50) p. 110.
91 Wortley in 67 HAGUE REcuEIL, 341, especially 413.
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C. Expropriation of Assets Outside the Expropriating State
As far as expropriations of assets outside the expropriating state are
concerned, most states have until recently considered the enforcement
of foreign expropriations of domestic assets just as incompatible with
their sovereignty as the enforcement of foreign confiscations.
We are, however, faced with the fact that during the Spanish Civil
War, France tolerated the requisition of Spanish vessels begun by wireless orders on the high seas to be completed in French ports. 92 During
World War II, British93 and United States94 courts recognized decrees
of the Norwegian and Dutch Governments-in-Exile, whereby the title
of property of their nationals situated outside of Norway or of the
Netherlands was transferred to the respective Government-in-Exile.
These decrees were nonconfiscatory, as they contained an obligation to
return the property to the owners at the end of the war. The above. mentioned cases cannot easily be brushed aside as being merely efforts
to aid a wartime ally. The supreme court of neutral Sweden had also
held a Norwegian decree transferring the ownership of a Norwegian
tanker in a Swedish harbor as "not departing from the fundamental
principles of Swedish Law." 95 After the war, the Austrian supreme
court9 6 as well as British97 and Canadian98 courts declared their readiness to grant foreign expropriations effect on domestic assets-provided
that indemnity is found just.
In a similar way, section ll5(b)(4) of the (American) Economic
Co-operation Act of 1948 obliged the countries receiving Marshall Plan
aid to locate and to put into appropriate use in furtherance of a joint program of European recovery, assets in the United States owned by their
nationals. The implementation of this obligation seems to require that
the United States recognize measures whereby the countries concerned
expropriate such assets. 99
92 Cour de Poitiers, Dec. 20, 1937, Societe Cementos Resola v. Larrasquitu et Etat
Espagnol, CLtINET 1938, p. 288.
93 Lorentzen v. Lydden & Co., [1942) i K.B. 202.
94 Anderson v. Transandine Handels-Maatschappij, 36 AM. J. IN-r. L. 701-07 (1942);
State of Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York and V. J. Archimedes, (D.C.
N.Y. 1948), 43 AM. J. IN-r. L. 181 (1949).
9 5The Rigmor, decision of March 17, 1942, 37 AM. J. IN-r. L. 141 (1943).
96 In the Hosiery Firm case, supra note 35.
97A/S Tallina Laevauhisus v. Estonian State S.S. Line, [1947), 80 LL. L.R. 99, Ill.
9 8 Laane and Baltser v. Estonian State Cargo and Passenger S.S. Line, [1949) 2
D.L.R. 641, 44 AM. J. IN-r. L. 201 (1950).
99 The government of the United States has, however, declined any obligation to
assist in carrying out such measures. E.g. in article II, 1 (a) iii of E.C.A. Agreement
between the United States and France of June 28, 1948.
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. These decisions seem hardly reconcilable with the principle of territoriality. We saw, however, that this principle is not the only one
involved when a foreign state takes private property. In all these cases
the respect due to foreign acts of state seems to be in favor of recognizing even confiscations. Considerations of public policy, which may well
be opposed to foreign confiscations of domestic assets, lose much of their
force in the case of expropri8;tions, where the former owner is compensated for the loss incurred.100 The principle of territoriality is thereby
robbed of one of its main supporting arguments. Moreover, in these
decisions the expropriations were directed exclusively against assets of
nationals of the expropriating state. The same decrees were held unenforceable where they would have affected domestic interests. The principle of territoriality, therefore, finds itself further weakened by another,
although controversial, argument. I refer to the doctrine that; on the
strength of the allegiance which a national owes to his home country,1° 1
this country may not only require him to hand over his assets held
abroad but may actually gain a title to such assets, which should be
recognized everywhere. It may also be said that volenti non fit injuria.
A state entitled to determine by itself the legal fate of all assets situated
inside its borders is perfectly free to cede this right partially to a foreign
state.
The real reason which made some states, at least, abandon the principle of territoriality in respect to expropriation is, however, economical.
Most states have expropriated private property in the course of "nationalization," although in varying extent. By accepting foreign expropriations of domestic assets they hope to gain in exchange recognition of
their title to the foreign assets of domestic companies which they themselves have expropriated. The rule of strict nonrecognition of foreign
expropriations would otherwise lead, e.g., to the appointment of a
French Curator for the Dieppe Installations of British Railways, who
would have to wind up and sell these assets for the benefit of the shareholders of the former Southern Railway Company.
A further argument in favor of the rule that foreign expropriation
of domestic assets should be admitted lies in the very fact that it has
been applied over some time by several countries and may therefore be
considered to have become customary law. As all exceptions to a generally admitted rule, this rule breaking away from the principle of terri100 In the above-mentioned English (cf. note 93) and United States (cf. note 94)
cases, it was even said that public policy required the recognition of the expropriation
decrees.
101 Blaclaner v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 52 S.Ct. 252 (1932).
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toriality should be interpreted as restrictively as possible. As set out
above, the rule shall apply only to domestic assets of nationals of the
foreign expropriating state. United States courts have refused to apply
it where interests of United States nationals or residents were concerned.102 The domestic courts should be the judge whether the indemnity paid by the foreign state is sufficient to transform an inadmissible confiscation into a permissible expropriation. British and Canadian
courts have held a 25% indemnity insufficient for this purpose.103 A
mere promise of an indemnity should not be sufficient either. I disapprove of a French decision where the demand of the owner for payment of the compensation before enforcement of a Spanish expropriation decree was refused as being offensive to the Spanish Government
as doubting its good faith. 104 I do side with writers on nationalization
who ask that indemnities should be transferable if the beneficiary resides outside the expropriating country and should not be subject to
excessive taxation.105

D. Compensation Agreements
A delicate point is the case of the agreements concerning indemnities for expropriations suffered by foreign nationals in Eastern European states. Does, for example, Czechoslovakia, by expropriating a
Czechoslovak company acquire a title to its British assets if this company, although belonging to British shareholders, is considered as having Czechoslovak nationality?
In my opinion, the terms of the Anglo-Czechoslovak Compensation
Agreement1° 6 or any other agreement of this type may be interpreted as
excluding any effect on assets situated in Great Britain. It speaks of
compensation for British rights affected by various Czechoslovak measures of "nationalization." As long, however, as no indemnity has been
paid, these measures constituted confiscations, which according to the
rules set out above could in no way affect property in the United Kingdom. The sum agreed on as compensation, therefore, does not include
compensation for these domestic assets. As long as no just compensation for these assets is offered, there can be no question of considering
102 Estate of Emanuel Kahn, 38 N.Y.S. (2d) 839 (1942) quoted by Lourie and
Meyer, "Governments in Exile and the Effect of their Expropriatory Decrees," 11 Umv.
Cm. L. REv. 26 at 43 (1943).
103 Cf. supra notes 97 and 98.
104 Cf. supra note 92.
105 Rado, "Czechoslovak Nationalization Decrees: Some International Aspects," 41
AM.. J. INT. L. 795 at 801 (1947).
106Compensation Agreement of ~ept. 28, 1949, CMD. 7797.
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them as having passed into the ownership of the Czechoslovak Government by virtue of expropriation.
When the rule of recognition of foreign expropriation of domestic
assets is as restrictively interpreted as above, I do think that a case can
be made for maintaining it. It is a solution which appears to be economically sound and does not seem inequitable.
I am aware of the fact that the present analysis of the problem of
extraterritorial effect of confiscations and expropriations gives more
weight to economical and ethical considerations than to principles of
legal theory. However, as we have seen, some of the principles of legal
theory which may be applied to the problem are in conllict with each
other. I therefore have felt free to base my choice between them on
these grounds outside the strict sphere of law, and I have felt all the
more free in doing so in view of the great economic importance of the
solutions arrived at. Incidentally, the economic soundness and relative
equity of these solutions may well have brought about their almost general acceptance, as indicated by the present study of the problem in comparative law.

